The defense of Paris is of decisive
military and political significance. Its loss would tear open the whole
coastal front north of the Seine and deprive Germany of bases for
very long-range warfare against England.
Historically, the loss of Paris always
meant the loss of France. The Führer repeats his order that Paris has to
be defended. . . . The strongest measures to quell insurrection
inside the city must be taken. . . . The bridges across the Seine are to
be prepared for demolition. Paris must not fall into enemy hands except
as a field of ruins.
Von Choltitz was stunned by the message. And he was also ashamed.
“Four days ago the factual order might have been considered. But the
situation had changed. The enemy was moving rapidly toward Paris. He had
captured the bridge at Melun. We had no troops available. The First
[German] Army consisted of a few remaining troops and was no fighting
force worth mentioning. I had no troops to confront tank divisions.” Von
Choltitz believed the order had no military validity and despaired at
the outright hatred it contained.After reading it, he showed it to his second in command, Colonel Hans Jay, an old friend. They were standing on the balcony outside von Choltitz’s office in the Hotel Meurice on the Rue de Rivoli. As Jay recalled, “In front of us the Tuileries lay in sunshine. To our right was the Place de la Concorde and to our left the Louvre. The scene merely underlined the madness of the medieval command.” Von Choltitz put the order in his pocket and showed it to no one else.
Later that day he called another old friend, Lieutenant General Hans Speidel, the chief of staff at Field Marshal Model’s headquarters in Cambrai. Von Choltitz and Speidel were friends from the prewar army and the Russian front, and von Choltitz considered Speidel very efficient and humane. “Thank you for the beautiful order,” said von Choltitz.
“What order, General?”
“The Field of Ruins Order.” Von Choltitz then went on to tell Speidel what he had done. Three tons of dynamite in Notre-Dame, two tons in the Dome at Les Invalides, and one ton in the Chamber of Deputies. He said he was presently working to detonate the Arc de Triomphe to improve visibility. “Hopefully you agree, Speidel.”
“Yes, yes, General.”
“Yes, but you ordered it.”
“We did not order it. The Führer ordered it.”
“Excuse me,” von Choltitz replied. “You have passed on the order and you will be responsible to history. I’ll tell you what else I’ve ordered. The Madeleine and the Opera are taken together. And the Eiffel Tower. I’ll detonate it so its metal structure will lie in front of the destroyed bridges.”
Speidel finally realized that von Choltitz was not serious and that he was talking just to illustrate the craziness of the order. He replied, “Oh, General, we are thankful you are in Paris.” They remained on the phone together for several more minutes, but then silence prevailed. “We knew,” said von Choltitz later. “We are at home in similar intellectual realms. On the telephone one better not talk about orders you disagree with. Important that we do not discuss the factual content of the order. Speidel knew like myself that it all did not matter anymore and what was left was embarrassment and empty words.”
Von Choltitz learned later that Model’s headquarters had received the order from Hitler but did not pass it on. His staff had found it on the network and given it to him. Some Germans in France agreed with von Choltitz and Speidel that Paris should not become a field of ruins. The same afternoon that he spoke to Speidel, von Choltitz received a phone call from Generaloberst Otto Dessloch, the commander of Luftflotte 3, the German tactical air force in France.
“Herr General,” said Dessloch, “I have orders to discuss with you about the air attack on Paris.”
Von Choltitz was shocked. Was the Luftwaffe going to bomb Paris while it was still occupied? Von Choltitz answered carefully. “I completely agree, but I hope you will come during the day.”
“No, we cannot risk that,” said Dessloch.
“You mean you are going to ignite the city with your ninety bombers at night? How do you think to do that?”
“We have been ordered to discuss that with you. You are supposed to name the targets.”
“Can you guarantee that you will hit the targets that I name at night?” von Choltitz responded.
Dessloch said that they would hit areas of the city, but he could not guarantee they could hit precise targets.
“Yes, do this,” von Choltitz replied. “But one thing is clear. I’ll withdraw my troops. You cannot assume that I’ll allow myself to be burned together with my soldiers by you. You probably know I’ve been ordered to stay in Paris. You’ll be responsible for my leaving the city.”
There was a lengthy pause in the conversation. Then Dessloch replied, “Yes, that probably means it cannot be done.”
“I’m thinking that as well,” von Choltitz replied. Later he wrote that it was obvious that he and Dessloch agreed and “did not wish this senseless and barbaric bombardment of the city.” But with their phone conversation likely monitored by the Gestapo, they had to talk to each other “tongue in cheek” so that everything would seem to be in line with orders.
August 23rd and 24th were difficult days for von Choltitz. He was determined to preserve Paris, but had to do so in such a way that he would not be relieved of command. He was aided by Ambassador Otto Abetz, who called on him to say that he was leaving Paris. Von Choltitz and Abetz found themselves in agreement on how to handle Paris, and with the end in sight, Abetz asked, “General, how can I be of help?”
“Mr. Ambassador, how can you possibly help me?”
“General, I will send a cable to headquarters and to Ribbentrop in which I complain about your brutal behavior in Paris.”
Von Choltitz was overwhelmed. He and Abetz had met a number of times before, and he could not believe what Abetz was saying. He jumped up from his desk and put his hands on Abetz’s shoulders. “You really want to do this? Then you are one of us.”
“Yes,” Abetz replied. “That I will do.”
As von Choltitz noted later, the cable Abetz sent to Berlin “protected me from being recalled or eliminated in a way that was typical for the time.”
In Paris itself, the situation was tense. On the morning of the 23rd, a German armored unit not part of von Choltitz’s command was taking advantage of the truce and moving through the city to the east. As it reached the foot of the Champs-Élysées, near the Grand Palais, it was fired on by Paris police, with one soldier being killed. The Germans responded immediately. The Grand Palais was a major Paris landmark between the Seine and the Champs-Élysées. It was one of the largest buildings in Paris, and the site of major expositions since the Universal Exhibition of 1900. It also housed the police of the 8th Arrondissement in the basement.
The German column was determined to avenge the shooting. They launched two small unmanned “Goliath” tanks—four feet long, two feet wide, and one foot high, carrying 50 kilograms of explosives, essentially remote-controlled bombs—at the Grand Palais. When they exploded, the explosions were so great that buildings shook for blocks around and the sound of the explosions echoed across Paris. There was a Swedish circus under way at the Palais, and the lions, tigers, and horses bolted for freedom, as did a collection of prostitutes imprisoned in the Palais by the police.
With animals stampeding and the Germans shooting at will, the situation deteriorated quickly. At noon order was restored when 40 Paris policemen surrendered under a white flag. They were delivered to von Choltitz, who said he would treat them as prisoners of war. Firemen finally extinguished the blaze, but the Grand Palais was left as a shell, with its interior totally destroyed. The episode demonstrated German strength and served to put the Resistance on notice. ... [mehr] https://lithub.com/on-hitlers-last-desperate-plan-to-destroy-paris/
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